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Last month *LCM* received a subscription from the University of the Negev in Beersheba, and ever since has been eagerly awaiting one from the University of Dan, if such there be, that it might claim to be known 'from Dan even to Beersheba' (*Judges* 20.1 is the first reference for that formulaic phrase, as the Editor learns from his *Cruden's Concordance* though the phrase was well-known to him and is, he thinks, as proverbial as 'from John o'Groats to Land's End'). *LCM* can indeed claim subscribers from Valparaíso and California to Japan and New Zealand, everywhere in fact where the study of the Classics is carried on. A natural exception is the Islamic world, which, despite its earlier role in the preservation of especially Greek medicine and philosophy (see J.E.Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* vol.1, 2nd edn, Cambridge 1906, pp.394-5 & 561-5), no longer sees itself as in any sense a member of the world of Western culture.

The Editor earlier maintained (12.9 [Nov.1987], 130) that 'a culture does not need, perhaps does not even have a moral obligation, to be continuously aware of the past that has made it what it is', though ironically aware that those who decry Latin and Greek are the most insistent that our schools should teach national history. He remembers, however, that it was a Japanese graduate student who told him that he thought the study of the Ancient World was the best way for a member of another cultural world to understand the West, and he begins to wonder whether it be not that 'heritage' (a word elsewhere much abused) which needs to be maintained in education in order that we of the 'West' may know what are our values. He commends to readers the Presidential address of his old master, Hugh Last, to the Classical Association in 1950, with the title 'Ancient History and Modern Education', or perhaps, with some trepidation, the work of T.S.Eliot, to be attacked, it is announced, by this year's President, the most recent translator of the *Oresteia*. But he is heartened by the announcement of the Annual Conference of the newly formed International Association of Classical Students, to be held in Trinity College Dublin from April 5th to 8th, 'A series of meetings, lectures and social events designed to encourage the study of classics and develop ties in the classical community', and not only because he has been asked to address it on the future of Classics or because, another heartening sign, it is apparently in part supported by the Bank of Ireland, which goes on to ask, 'Now, what can we do for you'.

The fact is, he supposes, that Classics needs many different things, publicists as well as scholars, linguists as well as archaeologists, Hellenists as well as Latinists, historians and

literary critics, and that no one of these classes should, as too frequently they do, lay claim to the whole of a restricted cake. Realistically, in the schools we should perhaps press for classical studies, not reserving the learning of the languages for the Universities (whose members had better learn how to do it better) but recognizing that it will only be possible in a few schools and there perhaps not always officially, and in the Universities provide rigorous courses of different types, catering for all talents and all interests, while still keeping alive scholarship of all types. All of which sounds as if it will mean a lot of hard work, but *pater ipse colendi haud facilem esse viam voluit*.

The Editor has also been taken to task for his spelling 'formatted', an illiterate solecism like 'benefitted', and despite his arguments that 'formated' was what he used to do in one aircraft on another (which sounds, but was not, obscene), he must yield to the unbiased arguments of his correspondent, from which he has much benefited.

Professor Jocelyn's review of Professor Brink's study of English Classical Scholarship attracted much interest, as both author and Editor can attest. It has been chosen to inaugurate, rather earlier than originally envisaged, the projected series of *Liverpool Classical Papers*, and may be had of the Publishers at the price of £2.50 or \$US5.00 (+ p. & p.), as a pamphlet in thermal binding with the title *Philology and Education*, ISBN 1 871245 00 1

The history of scholarship, not only in England (Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man and Ireland [speaking geographically] the Editor hastens to add), is also the subject of a projected Greenbank Colloquium in the spring of next year, and the Editor would be glad to hear from those who might be interested in attending or offering papers. Like those of the Colloquium on Homer 1987, the appearance of which has been delayed by the adoption of the new technology (an excuse which readers must feel is by now wearing a bit thin), these too will be published as a *Liverpool Classical Paper*.

The Roman
Revolution:
Forty Years

Thus with the spring returning, new desires . . . The climate affects even a



Corrigenda to J.F.Lavery, LCM 12.10 (Dec.1987), 154-6. P.154, end of page, for *l-ζει* (F) read *l-ξει* and for *l-ζει* read *l-ξει* (Tri.), and throughout read *ξ* for *ζ*, thus *ξει* from *ξέω*, *ξει* *πρός* *ἐνδικοῖς* *φρεσίν*, *σπλάγχνα* *δ'οὔτοι* *ματᾶν* *ξει* *πρός* . . . *κέαρ*, *Τραυματική* *ξέω* . . . *ξέομεθα*, *ξέει* *τὰ* *ἔντερα* . . . Contracted *ξέω*, *καταξοδυντί*, *ἀναξών*.

The Editor much regrets that he boiled and did not scrape: the keys for Z and X (= ζ and ξ) are adjacent on the keyboard, so that this was not a case of confusion of the letter forms.

to F.M.A.Jones, LCM 12.10 (Dec.1987), 148ff, Lafleur's article, cited throughout as BICS 4 (1979), 158-177, should be ICS (*Illinois Classical Studies*) 4.(1979), 158-177.

to W.S.Watt, LCM 13.2 (Feb.1988), 25. Line 9: for 'it it is taken' read 'if it is taken'; line 12 for *fruticet*<a> read *fruticet*<a>; line 24 for *suumit* read *sumit*.

to D.N. Levin, LCM 13.1 (Jan.1988), the reference in the last line of § 1 should be *Carm.* 3.9.21, not 3.9.1.

Correspondence from Mr A.J.Barron, 22 Beach Road, Ilfracombe, Devon, EX34 9QZ 8.2.1988

Dear Editor, In welcoming the article (Jan.'88) by D.N. Levin on Nisbet's emendation *Sidone* at *Hor.Carm.* 3.1.42, may I try and dispel his hesitation over scansion.

Your printing has marked as short the last -e of *Sidone*; but the one at issue is the middle one, the -o-. The -o- indeed appears short in the two Martial instances adduced, the only ones for the fabric in *OLD* at *Sidon*. *OLD* also has articles *Sidonicus*, *Sidonis* and *Sidonius*, with remarks on variable prosody of the last two, while skipping an anomaly (V.Fl.6.95) at *Sidonicus*. In overall neither Vergil nor Ovid nor pseudo-Tibullus nor Propertius escape instances of shortening – so why not Horace? And in Ch.3 of Alan Treloar's edition of *Horace the Minstrel* by Noel Bonavia-Hunt there seems (despite topic) sound reasoning associating ictus in the Alcaic with Roman hark-back to the Saturnian, and commending the mellifluous in syllables that escape such ictus. My Augustan refs. from *OLD* are Verg.A.4.545; Ov.Ars 3.252, *TR.* 4.2.27, *Ep.* (Her.) 9.101; Prop.2.29.15; (Tib.) 3.3.18. And the dactyl *Sidonis* (Dido) at Ov.*Met.* 14.80 is only two words from the adj. *Phrygii* (Aeneas) – just as the restoration *Sidone* (at *Hor.Carm.* 3.1.42) is only three words from a *Phrygius*.

Yours sincerely, A.J.Barron.

Lucius Cornelius Sulla, as the first Roman to declare civil war on his country, is of immense importance in understanding the process through which the Roman Republic was destroyed, yet he is surprisingly little studied. The most comprehensive modern work, that of Keaveney is a useful compilation of the sources, and many other writers seem content to accept the overall viewpoint of the ancient writers. However, although our sources for the Sullan period are fairly detailed, many are based on accounts by Sulla's supporters, and particularly on that of Sulla himself, and are thus heavily, if subtly, biased especially in the basic assumptions they make about the moral and legal positions of the figures involved: of Sulla's actions, only the proscriptions receive condemnation from the ancients, and even then Sulla is excused on the grounds that he was not fully aware of what was happening. I aim to cast some doubt on this picture of Sulla as a wronged defender of stable, traditional government, and portray instead a man whose only real concern was Lucius Cornelius Sulla.

In his early career Sulla's views are unknown. He started late, thanks to poverty, and only a number of opportune legacies allowed him to enter political life at all. His aims, like those of many other young Roman aristocrats, were probably simply to rise as high up the Senatorial ladder as possible. Although he was a patrician, his family has been politically obscure for generations and, despite obvious ambition, his chances of reaching the highest ranks must have seemed at first slim. He was lucky, however, in that his first major position was as quaestor to Marius in the first Jugurthine War. Marius recognized his ability and was quite happy to entrust Sulla with vital missions guaranteed to bring him career-boosting publicity.

Sulla's ambition showed in the tactless way in which he reacted to his success. In a number of arrogant gestures, one of which (Bocchus' Capitoline statue) may have had the backing of an anti-Marian Senate, he virtually claimed to have won the war single-handed. Later, after the German Wars, when he has estranged himself from Marius, Sulla was to claim that jealousy had eventually stopped his old commander from assigning him worthy positions. Marius was certainly provoked, and Sulla was to prove consistently disloyal and ungrateful, yet Marius continued to grant commands to his former quaestor throughout the German Wars, and he accepted Sulla's defection to Catulus. Sulla's arrogance showed again in the East, especially in his treatment of Parthian envoys, and when Marius' enemies began to gain the upper hand, Sulla was enthusiastic in joining them, despite the debt he owed to the great general. Overcoming failures and prosecutions, he finally reached the consulship at about the age of fifty in 88 B.C. (hardly the first year he was eligible) after shining in the Social War. It is at this point that our information becomes full enough for us to form a view of his policy aims.

Keaveney, a believer in the image of Sulla as the great defender of Optimate government, states that Sulla's plan to restore the primacy of the Senate in Roman politics was constant throughout his career, and had his life been more peaceful he would anyway have legislated along much the same lines as he was later to do, and that his popularity would have ensured the laws their passage. This must be false, for so far Sulla's popularity had served to keep him waiting eight years past the minimum age of a consulship, and no-one would ever be popular enough to pass laws banning the corn dole and muzzling the tribunate: only an autocrat could do what Sulla was later to achieve, and so, not surprisingly, we see no programme of legislation from Sulla as consul before the first march on Rome. It is only when his command and the wealth and glory it would bring were threatened that we see Sulla acting in Rome at all, to declare a ban on public business and thus block Sulpicius' law to transfer the command to Marius. When this move failed Sulla put his own interests before any concern with stable government and marched on Rome.

Sulpicius' law is portrayed in the sources as a vital act of revolution, and indeed there is a consistent tendency to hint that the State was in revolt from Sulla rather than *vice-versa*, whenever the two conflict. However, whatever the wisdom of sending a man of Marius' age on such a command, it must be remembered that not only did the old general have experience of both the East and of Mithridates, but that such a transfer of command was both legal and precedented. For example, the Jugurthine command had been transferred to Marius from Metellus. Sulla himself was soon to attempt to transfer Pompey Strabo's command to his consular colleague, and when coaxing his men into the march on Rome Sulla did not mention the legality of the transfer

even though the law had been passed in rather doubtful circumstances, but merely harped upon the possibility that the soldiers could lose booty should Marius choose to take a different army to the war. His officers were in no doubt about the position and deserted *en masse*.

Once Sulla was the absolute master of Rome, he brought out his programme of reform. These laws were passed *per vim* and were thus no laws at all. His opponents were proscribed to be executed without trial for offences not against the law but against Sulla, and although this further criminal act included the murder of a sacrosanct tribune, the great supporter of stable government refused to stand trial.

It is hard to distinguish the laws passed in 88 from those of the dictatorship, and I will deal with Sulla's programme in discussing the latter. But a move against the tribunate at this point is quite understandable as a block to any other would-be Sulpicius, i.e. a defence of Sulla's own position rather than an attempt to restore noble rule *per se*. One law we can be sure of, however, is the restoration of Sulla's Eastern command. This was passed by force. Sulla's very position ensured that, whether or not the force was actually on display, and was thus illegal, and in any case the law was soon repealed. Sulla was never at any time a legally appointed proconsul of the Senate and People of Rome.

Sulla left for the East leaving Cinna in the consulship, and here again we see the way in which the innuendo of the sources has led modern writers astray. Cinna's election has sometimes been seen as somehow wrong, as though because Sulla did not approve of him his election was an act of revolt. It may well have been an act of protest, but Sulla was a rebel, he was not, even as consul, the State, and the election was perfectly legitimate.

What was not legitimate, however, was the expulsion of Cinna and his deposition as consul. Sulla is often portrayed as having no choice but to march on Rome when relieved of a command by a law of the Roman People, while Cinna is regarded as an evil tyrant for repeating the exploit when expelled by Octavius. In fact the positions are reversed, and the case of Cinna is the stronger. The Senate and the consul Octavius were completely *ultra vires* in deposing a consul. It was a move that virtually put them in revolt from the State, and, as Cinna quite rightly pointed out to the army at Capua, if they were allowed to get away with it the People's votes would henceforth count for nothing, as the Senate could simply refuse to accept magistrates of whom it disapproved.

In these circumstances Cinna had to fight, and despite the oath of obedience that Sulla had extorted from him we have to face the fact that in doing so it was the much vilified Cinna who was defending the constitution. He even stamped out the worst excesses of Marius' desire for revenge by eliminating his large group of thugs.

Cinna was hardly perfect, but although he now held successive consulships he had Marius as a precedent and he seems to have made a genuine effort to hold the Senate together through the emergency, and to conciliate the nobility and Sulla, as well as defusing the renewed rumblings of the recently enfranchized allies. Quite rightly the rebel ex-consul's property was confiscated and his usurped command rescinded, but otherwise Sulla was negotiated with, and was even offered a complete amnesty, but to no effect. Memnon tells us that the official Roman army sent against Mithridates under Flaccus had explicit instructions to cooperate with Sulla if possible, and otherwise to fight the king first. Finally, when it did become apparent that Sulla would have to be suppressed by force, Cinna attempted to mount a training expedition to Illyria to ensure that his men were a match for Sulla's veterans when they did meet, possibly again away from Italy.

Meanwhile, in Greece and despite sterling military service, the great upholder of power-sharing and Senatorial rule was showing his true colours once again. He ignored all attempts at Senatorial rule over himself, ordered out the governor of Macedonia, who had been fighting a rearguard action, and refused to cooperate with Flaccus' army, eventually even subverting it. Finally he committed two acts of gross treason. Firstly, in refusing naval help to the official Roman army, which otherwise had Mithridates trapped at Pitane, he virtually rescued the king; secondly, he then allied himself to this very man, whose total destruction was his only claim to legitimacy. With no authority whatsoever, Sulla declared an ally of the Roman People a man who had invaded Roman territory and put to death up to 80,000 Romans and Italians. Even his devoted army was shocked, and, as Appian admits, Sulla can have had no other aim than his own self interests, to secure his rear for the invasion of Italy and to save the irreplaceable time and manpower which would have been used up in suppressing the king completely.

In Rome, whatever measures were passed in 88, and whatever Sulla's propaganda may say,

the nobility had no concept of Sulla as their protector. They had no doubt where legality lay, and almost all stayed in Rome to work the legitimate government, many, including consulars, holding office. Even close relatives of the proscribed, like Mark Antony's father, were confident enough of their safety under the regime to stay, and of those who did flee by no means all ran to Sulla: Crassus went to Spain, Metellus to Africa, and even Cornutus, who was actually proscribed and thus in immediate mortal danger, went to Gaul.

It was only when Sulla committed the final act of invading Italy and, with Cinna dead and the government in disarray, looked likely to win, that the nobility defected *en masse* to the officially proclaimed public enemy, and then they moved not to restore the Senate but to save their skins. This, however, did not make good publicity. It was precisely this spineless lack of conviction on the part of some Senators which was to ensure that any attempt at a real restoration of Senatorial government would fail. Sulla needed a good cause to give him the appearance of fighting for something worthy, and the group of frightened Senators that now surrounded him needed to restore their dignity. What could be better than to agree that, all along, Sulla had been the champion of the nobles and of constitutional government and that the elected magistrate of the Roman People were in fact criminal usurpers from whom the nobles had only now managed to escape, and who still persisted in opposing the saviour. Sulla's belief in his *felicitas* must have been boosted to unknown heights. He had invaded as a self-seeking rebel, and suddenly he was a deliverer and champion of *libertas*. His new concern with stability and legitimacy did not, however, prevent him from accepting illegally raised troops commanded by the *privatus* Pompey, from fighting one of the bloodiest civil wars that Italy was ever to see, proscribing and executing thousands of opponents without trial, disenfranchizing citizens (which Cicero tells us was legally impossible), expropriating large tracts of land for his men, and allowing himself to enter the city without losing his usurped *imperium*, all of which added to his already long list of acts which, although understandable in a ruthless drive for personal power, guaranteed the destruction of the oligarchic rule he now claimed to be restoring.

With the war over, Sulla had himself proclaimed dictator, but this was not the long-lapsed dictatorship of old; it was really a new office under an old name. His power was absolute, his word was law and his term of office unlimited. He had achieved his personal political aim; he was the most powerful man in the state.

However, Sulla had to play his part well if he was to maintain his role as liberator. If he simply held on to the dictatorship for life, or tried to form a monarchy of some kind, he would soon lose his noble support and would frustrate the ambition of, and so alienate, his subordinates.

He may anyway not have envisaged any form of personalized rule in an institutionalized form, and we should not fall into anachronism and begin to compare his aims with those of Augustus, despite the apparent similarities in their positions. In view of his later actions I feel it more likely that Sulla now wanted to give his position the appearance, and even the fact, if that were possible, of absolute normality, so that he could indeed be seen to have restored Senatorial rule and the normal workings of the constitution, as promised, and to have resigned all office so as to leave power for his oligarchic colleagues; at the same time, however, he could ensure that this was done in such a way as to leave his informal *auctoritas* in an unassailably dominant position, and it is with this thought in mind that I now turn to Sulla's legislative programme.

First, however, one more important point must be made if we are fully to understand Sulla's aims. If his actions so far have been entirely self-seeking, his programme as dictator has often been seen as something more noble if perhaps ultimately futile. He is portrayed as a great rebuilder, passing laws to restore the state and give it firm Senatorial rule, turning back the political clock to the days before the *lex Hortensia* of 287 B.C., believing that this was in the best interests of his country. A cynic might say that there was little point in going to such lengths to achieve power if, having gained it, he did not intend to make use of it, and that his reforms would cause history to look more kindly on his actions to date. But even this is to fall into a trap. Sulla was never to benefit from his own laws. He died soon after they were passed, and here lies the point, for many historians seem subconsciously to have accepted it as historically inevitable that Sulla's laws were to be left to fend for themselves, and thus that their creator was not intended to benefit from them. The only comment passed is usually that Sulla's new constitution would have had more chance of survival had he lived to oversee it.

This sense that the laws were made with only others in mind is further heightened because Plutarch tells us that Sulla himself knew he was soon to die, having been so warned many years

before by a Chaldaean astrologer, and quotes Sulla's own memoirs as his source. Unfortunately for Sulla, Plutarch then proceeds to give the game away by telling us that the famous Chaldaean only makes his appearance in the 21st and final book of the memoirs, and goes on to say that his book was written only days before Sulla's death when he really did know that he was dying. In the same passage Plutarch also dispels the myth that, having stepped down from office, Sulla had effectively retired from politics by telling us that he was still occupied with public life and that the final cause of his death was a haemorrhage brought on by straining his already weakened constitution while bellowing out an order of execution – an order, moreover, that he would appear to have had no legal power to give.

If we accept, then, that when he came to the dictatorship Sulla believed that he still had many years to live, his programme (while admittedly deliberately strengthening the Senate) makes sense not as an attempt to restore noble rule *per se* but as a plan to consolidate, yet regularize, his own supreme position, and it is worth looking at his principal acts to see how they fit this scheme.

The first move was ruthlessly to stamp out his opponents. At least 1,600 men were killed in Rome, some, it would seem, simply for their wealth, and all over Italy land was expropriated from what were by then citizen communities and given to Sulla's veterans, who thus constituted a personal organ of control over the peninsula (he did not, however, institute for the future a system of State provision for veterans which really might have helped oligarchic government). Having secured his control of Italy Sulla turned to the centre and the constitution of Rome itself.

As Augustus was to realize, the Senate could make a fine instrument for concealed personal rule. If Sulla could concentrate power in the Senate, then so long as he could control the Senate he controlled Rome without needing to hold any official position that would set him apart from the rest of the nobles. If, in any case, he felt that the Senate should hold the dominant position, then so much the better.

The tribunate had in fact become one of the major threats to Senatorial rule, and so it was now very thoroughly muzzled. The tribunes lost their right to initiate legislation, their right of veto was restricted, and they were banned from holding further office, so that the ambitious and able would henceforth shun the position. To make absolutely sure Sulla also transferred all voting away from the tribal assembly, which the tribunes has generally used, to the more conservative *comitia centuriata*, into which he place 10,000 freed and enfranchized slaves, the so-called Cornelii, as a personal voting block, and which he further controlled by making it illegal for a bill to be voted on without prior Senatorial approval.

The Senate's position was further strengthened when Sulla created new permanent courts and transferred the right to perform jury service from the *equites* to the Senators. It was also strengthened by regularization of the Senatorial career, restrictions on repeated election to the same office, and controls over ambitious provincial governors, who were probably now in any case intended to hold office only for one year, if we see as significant Sulla's raising of the numbers of annual magistrates with *imperium* to the same figure as there were provinces. These arrangements were obviously intended to stick, and when one of Sulla's own supporters, Ofella, tried to break one of the new age limits for office, Sulla had him killed.

It is the next point, however, that casts most doubt on the altruistic Sullan line. The Senate had become depleted through war, time and the proscriptions, but instead of merely making up its numbers Sulla actually doubled them to 600. This is often seen as a move to ensure that the Senate could staff the new courts, and the idea had been in the wind since Livius Drusus; but it must be noted that the move also meant that the majority of Senators now owed their position directly to Sulla, giving him a very strong position in what was now the supreme organ of the State. The move would also fit a consistent policy of inserting supporters into, rather than seeking them in, key areas, Italy with his veterans, the assembly with the Cornelii, and now the Senate.

A final boost to his personal position can be seen in his adoption of the cognomen Felix. While this name may not carry quite the profound religious significance often claimed for it, it did carry greater connotations than the English word 'lucky'. It was meant to show not that he had reached his position through a series of happy accidents, but that because he was in some mysterious way not like other men he was intended to achieve what he had – events somehow moved themselves to allow his passage – in short, he deserved to rule.

Having passed his laws Sulla now felt able to lay down office, confident that his *auctoritas* was unchallengeable. Unfortunately, before he could enjoy his position he died, and only the magnificence of his public funeral betrayed his real status.

Finally, having discussed what Sulla did intend, I would like to cast doubt on another aim that is sometimes attributed to him. Sulla is reported as having a hatred for the equestrian order, whose commercial nature he regarded as being in conflict with the interests of Senatorial government, and whose power he therefore attempted to repress. It is true that in removing the courts from equestrian control he prevented the abuses of power by certain *publicani* which had given rise to cases such as that of Rutilius. But it is probably time that we got away from the idea of the *equites* as a commercial bourgeoisie, and saw them instead as simply the upper class outside the Senate, with interests in fact much the same as those of the Senators, coming as they did from essentially the same social group. Unlike the Senators they legally could, and therefore did, engage in commercial activity, but their principal wealth was still in land. We should therefore see Sulla's emphasis as a boost for the Senate and not as a deliberate snub to the *equites*.

Two other main pieces of evidence for Sulla's supposed hatred are easily dealt with. Firstly, *equites* suffered heavier casualties in the proscriptions than did Senators: but then, they always did in every major purge for which we have figures, well into the imperial period. The simple explanation is that there were more of them than there were Senators, yet they were still influential enough to attract trouble. Their casualties as a proportion of their number may have been much the same as those of the Senate.

The second piece of evidence is the fact that when raising taxes in Asia in 84 Sulla had not used the mainly equestrian *publicani* but his own soldiers. This again is hardly surprising. Mithridates had killed all the Italians he could find in Asia, and any survivors would have fled. There would not have been time for them to reestablish their organization in the newly recovered province when Sulla wanted the money, especially as their capital was based in a Cinnan Rome which was not eager to subsidize a rebel general. By 74 they were back, still operating under the Gracchan *lex Sempronia*, which had not therefore been repealed, and some would see signs of their return as early as 78 in the *senatus consultum de Asclepiade*.

In fact by enlarging the Senate and the numbers of offices available Sulla allowed greater political involvement to this wider upper class, and the sources report that all the newly co-opted Senators were *equites*, as was Sulla's new henchman, Pompey. While Sulla's break with Marius, well known for his leanings towards the *equites*, was probably unconnected with the issue.

In the end, then, I would suggest that Sulla's political aims were directed almost wholly towards his own personal advancement. He is lucky in the image he has left to posterity, partly because he was so successful and partly because he had the sense and skill to write the history of his life himself, but most of all because he died when he did, and I suspect that if Sulla had lived ten years longer we would now have a very different idea of what he was about. As it was the new constitution lasted little longer than his measures of 88 (even if some details survived), because their purpose had gone.

Senatorial government still had some life in it, although it was now fatally flawed by Sulla's own actions, but, as he watched the great nobles of Rome troop humbly into Brundisium and saw among them men of the quality of Catiline and Verres, Sulla himself would probably have seen eye to eye with Tiberius Caesar on their fitness to rule.

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Christina Dedoussi (Athens): *The future of Plangon's child in Menander's Samia*,
LCM 13.3(Mar.1988), 39-42

I thank Professor F.H.Sandbach, who read this article and made helpful comments on it.

F.H.Sandbach in his article 'Two notes on Menander (*Epitrepontes* and *Samia*)', published in LCM 11.9 (Nov.1986), pp.156-160 and under the subtitle 'Had Chrysis in *Samia* lost her own child', argued in favour of the 'traditional view' that Chrysis lost her own child¹, against my view that there was no child of Chrysis. Unfortunately I could not convince the eminent Menandrian scholar that Chrysis' child is superfluous in the plot of the *Samia* and intrusive to the interpretation of this comedy.

Chrysis' hypothetical child originated from lines 50ff. of the Cairo Papyrus (265ff. in Bodmer Pap.), and the only evidence for its short existence was Demeas' report that he saw her

¹ Sandbach mentioned in his article (p.159) the scholars who have accepted this view.

giving the baby her breast². But this does not necessarily mean that Chrysis was really suckling Plangon's baby. She was merely trying to calm the baby (239), and it seems that this was a common practice in antiquity, as it still was early in this century in China, according to the novelist Pearl S. Buck³. The Bodmer *Samia* has shown clearly that Plangon's baby was suckled by its own mother (535-6 and 540-1), thus Chrysis' ability to suckle is unnecessary. Demeas having been already told that Chrysis was the mother of the baby concluded that it was really hers because he saw her giving it the breast⁴. The spectators understood that Demeas was mistaken in two ways, because Chrysis was neither the mother of this child, nor was she suckling it.

According to Sandbach's opinion, Demeas was mistaken only in his conclusion that Chrysis was the mother of the child. He takes 'giving her breast' as meaning only 'suckling', and therefore infers that she was herself a mother. But it is not so important for the interpretation of the *Samia* whether or not Plangon's baby had a second source of milk (Sandbach p.160) as what was the intended future of this baby, and my objections concern mainly what Sandbach says in his article about Plangon's baby, which is, in a way, the mute protagonist of this comedy. My discussion here will be confined to the most important points of interpretation.

I do not agree with Sandbach's opinion that 'In what remains of the play Moschion says nothing of what would have been done with the baby he had taken from Plangon, but an ancient audience would see that without Chrysis' intervention exposure was the only practical option open to him' (p.159). The dramatist had made clear to the audience from the beginning of the play, in Moschion's introductory monologue, the future of Plangon's child: Moschion admitted that he was its father, and he gave Plangon's mother his solemn promise to marry Plangon, evidently not for her sake only but for the child's as well, or rather, it was the child's future and benefit that came first⁵. When the baby – a boy – was born he brought it to his house (64 & 649f.).

Moschion's words and actions indicated clearly to the ancient audience that this baby was recognized by its father and was a future Athenian citizen⁶. Moschion was determined to marry Plangon, the mother of his child and daughter of an Athenian citizen. It was therefore impossible

² It was supposed that Chrysis' baby was born shortly before Plangon's baby and died conveniently shortly after. There were variations: it was exposed or stillborn (Sisti p.9), Chrysis had a miscarriage (Bain p.xiii).

³ *The Mother* (first published in 1934, Magnum edn. 1978), p.15: 'Now in the darkness the boy nuzzled against her, fumbling at her breast. She let him suckle, lying in warm drowsiness. Her breast was dry, but it was soft and gave remembered comfort to the child. Soon it would be full again'. The mother is pregnant and the boy five years old.

⁴ The understanding of this passage is completed with the important repetition of the same event in Act IV, 532-6 and 540-1 (Nikeratos saw his daughter suckling her baby), where Demeas' words to Nikeratos show indirectly what had happened to himself (542 *τυχόν ἐπαιζεν* and 543 *τυχόν ἴσως ἔδοξε*). Note also the correspondence of *κορυzaίς* (546) with *οὐδ'εὶ βλέπω . . . οἶδα καλῶς ἐπὶ* (213f.). Another point: when Moschion told Demeas that Chrysis is not the mother of the child (503f.) Demeas believed him readily without any objection, tacitly cancelling his impression that he saw her suckling the baby.

⁵ See *Epitrep.* 566-571. Charisios would divorce Pamphile in order to marry his child's mother, clearly for the child's sake.

⁶ I doubt whether this baby can be called 'illegitimate' (Sandbach p.158), and certainly it is not a *νόθος* ('bastard'), because its father is an Athenian citizen, its mother is an Athenian woman and its father has recognized it. See R.Sealey, 'On lawful Concubinage in Athens', *Class.Antiq.* 3 (1984), 111-133: 'Athenian law posed the question of legitimacy not in relation to the marital union itself, but in relation to the capacity of the children to inherit citizenship and the estate' (p.132); 'No extant text says what the criterion was for being a *nothos* (except as the term applies to children of mixed parentage), conjecture is possible: *nothos* was a child whose parentage was open to dispute' (p.127), and, it must be added, whose parentage was unknown. It must be taken into consideration that the recognition of a child as an Athenian citizen consisted of a series of civil and religious acts performed in the course of many years. See J.Rudhart, 'La reconnaissance de la paternité, sa nature et sa portée dans la société athénienne', *MH* 19 (1962), 39-64: 'Ils visent, par une opération rituelle, à intégrer l'enfant dans les organismes complexes de la société athénienne, et par ces intermédiaires, dans la cité; ils sont avant tout une initiation aux cultes de ces communautés mais cette initiation confère à celui qui en est l'objet des privilèges matériels et des droits' (p.59).

for an ancient audience to think that this child's future could be exposure; consequently Sandbach's explanation of Moschion's act ('By taking the baby Moschion relieved them – Plangon and her mother – of the distressing necessity of exposing it themselves', p.159) cannot be possible or right. Moschion's child could not be saved from exposure in order to be passed off as Demeas' bastard son by a foreign *hetaira*, who took it for good and 'adopted' it (Sandbach pp.159, 160). Especially Sandbach's remark that Moschion got rid of the baby (by giving it to Chrysis) in order to conceal his crime (p.160) is based on a rather exaggerated estimate of his crime. The fact that Plangon's baby was born before her marriage was certainly an irregularity, and Moschion's behaviour was a crime against the girl's father. But since the child was recognized by its father, who willingly promised to marry its mother, and the mother was certainly happy to be married to a very eligible young man – not to mention the existence of love –, Moschion's crime could have only happy consequences and it was itself neither unusual nor unforgivable (465ff.)⁷

Moschion had no reason either to expose or to get rid otherwise of his child. On the contrary, this child was virtually a future Athenian citizen and Moschion was compelled by law to perform all the religious and civil acts so that the child would eventually obtain all its rights of *ἀγχιστεία* and *παιτεία*⁸. And the ancient audience could rather be pleased, when Demeas expelled Chrysis from his house, if this foreign *hetaira*, for her own advantage, had thought to deceive him for good (Sandbach pp.158 & 160). The rather melodramatic story of a poor woman of the demi-monde, who wanted to settle down with a family of her own and thus to be saved from poverty and her bad profession, reminds us, perhaps, of modern popular novels or films, but it does not fit into New Comedy, where the conventional conditions of an idealized society did not accept a child borne by a foreign *hetaira* to an Athenian citizen; at least no such case has yet been found in Menander or elsewhere in New Comedy.

The service which Chrysis offered to Moschion was, according to my view, that she agreed to pretend temporarily that she was the mother of the child, and accordingly she undertook its rearing. This temporary arrangement protected Plangon's reputation, gave an explanation of the presence of a baby in Demeas' house, and made it possible for Plangon to be near her baby easily and regularly⁹. After the arrival of the fathers, Moschion (in panic), Chrysis and Parmenon (acting as an adviser) decided to adhere to this arrangement (77-86)¹⁰. Chrysis consented readily and rather thoughtlessly to run personal risks, probably not knowing, as a foreigner, what exactly a bastard son meant for an Athenian¹¹, and anyway she counted upon Demeas' love (80ff.). She preferred, for the baby's well-being, to run personal risks rather than see it removed hastily from Demeas' house and entrusted to a nurse. Chrysis was evidently thinking that to entrust the child to a nurse would be a temporary expedient. Since the deception of Demeas would last only until the end of Moschion's wedding Chrysis could hope for Demeas' forgiveness¹². Her altruistic motives would make her more lovable to Demeas and at the same time she would deservedly win Moschion's and Plangon's friendship and support. In this way Chrysis strengthens her position in Demeas' house rather than, by imposing on him the burden of a bastard son, as Sandbach believes (p.158). Chrysis belongs to the type of the good *hetaira*, who improves her personal and social position with her good character and behaviour¹³.

⁷ See *Fab. Incerta* 27ff. and 55.

⁸ If not, Moschion's son, after his coming of age, had the right to bring a charge against his father, demanding all the rights he had by birth. See Rudhart (op.cit. in n.6), p.51.

⁹ There is also the case of the *hetaira* Habrotonon in *Epitrep.* (511-534 & 867-9), who pretended that she was the mother of the foundling in order to find its father and afterwards its mother.

¹⁰ I take *τρέφω* here (77f.) in the general sense of 'bringing up', 'rearing', which is its usual meaning in *Samia* and elsewhere in Menander (*Epitrep.* 251, 321, 467; *Perik.* 794, 795, 800; *Sik.* 53, fr.1, 3 etc.). Sandbach takes it (pp.159f.) in the narrow sense (applied to women) of 'feeding', 'suckling', but in *Samia* 279, 318, 401 and 523, where the subject of the verb is Chrysis, its meaning cannot be 'feed' or 'suckle'.

¹¹ See *Epitrep.* 645f. and 894ff..

¹² Sandbach says (p.160) that the deception of Demeas by Chrysis does not matter, because Demeas 'will remain happily ignorant of it', but the text shows that Demeas was in fact quite unhappy with a bastard son and an *hetaira* 'wife' (129-136).

¹³ There is also the similar case of Thais in Terence's *Eunuchus* (Chrysis in Menander's

For supporting his view that Moschion gave his child to Chrysis for good, Sandbach 'finds it significant that after Demeas had made it clear that he is warmly in favour of the marriage Moschion says not a word about the baby or any desire to resume it. But there is no reason for supposing that knowledge that the pair were fruitful would make his father take a different view' (p.160). It seems that here Sandbach overlooks the dramatic reasons for silence about the baby. If Demeas were informed about the real parents of the baby in Act II Menander could not write Act III and the rest of his comedy because there could be no misunderstanding, no suspicion, no anger, no expulsion of Chrysis.

On the other hand the dramatist has carefully prepared Moschion's silence¹⁴. He said that confession of his sin would cause grief to Demeas (2-4) and destroy his good image as *κοσμίος* (18), that he does not know how to speak to his father about his marriage (65-66), that he is not a good speaker (94-95). He decided to prepare a speech (94-95), but he was unsuccessful (120-126). From the existing text we understand that Moschion obtained Demeas' consent to marry Plangon too easily, because Demeas had already decided on this match. Accordingly there was no reason for Moschion to make an untimely revelation of the truth about the baby. He expressed only his impatience to finish with the wedding as soon as possible (151f., 157ff.). Similarly Moschion did not tell the truth to Demeas, when he was informed by Nikeratos of Chrysis' expulsion, because of the baby (Sandbach p.160). Moschion could not imagine the true reasons for Chrysis' expulsion; he thought that Demeas had after all done what he threatened to do in 133f.¹⁵ This explains his reaction and indignation (451ff.). In the course of the same scene, when Moschion found out the true reason for Chrysis' expulsion, he revealed the truth to his father only; the presence of Nikeratos during this scene (451-539) increases the intensity of the misunderstanding (for more comic effects); Moschion cannot tell the truth in front of Nikeratos.

An important question remains without a definite answer: what happened (if *συμβέβηκε* has this meaning here) *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* in lines 55f.? The fragmentary condition of the text does not permit more than the following remarks. The expressions *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* and *καὶ μάλα* cannot be taken with any form of the verb *πίπτω*¹⁶, because the meaning of this verb does not make sense with them. Sandbach (p.159) accepted the view (H.D.Blume and E.Keuls) that *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* is 'the loss of her own child, born slightly before' and that the death of Chrysis' child was a 'lucky chance' (p.159) for Moschion's child. In this interpretation the use of the expression *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* is, I think, strange (an unattractive oxymoron) because the death of a baby (in fact an unlucky chance) is considered as an intervention *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* (a lucky chance).

My own tentative proposal (*Entretiens Hardt* 16 [1970], p.162) that *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* can be Chrysis' presence in Demeas' house, needs further elucidation. When Moschion helped, or encouraged in a certain way, Demeas to take Chrysis into his house (23ff.) he had not, of course, foreseen that Chrysis could be useful to himself, and when he brought the baby into the house Chrysis' presence provided a solution of his problem; she readily offered to pretend that she was the mother of the baby. Her offer can be said to have been made *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου*. I did not mean that Chrysis was present and living in Demeas' house *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου*, but that her assistance was an *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* result of her presence there¹⁷.

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Εὐνοῦχος), who offers her disinterested help and runs personal risks in order to restore Pamphila to her family (746, 749-50). She gained in the end friendship and protection (869-871). On the *χρησταὶ ἐταῖραι* of New Comedy and Menander see Plutarch, *Mor.* 712c, *Quaest. conv.* 7.8.3 (*Testimonia* 42, Körte II).

¹⁴ Cf. Demeas' silence about the true reasons for Chrysis' expulsion (351-6 & 374).

¹⁵ That is, to expel Chrysis with the child out of his house. See also 352-355.

¹⁶ There are the proposals *ἐτίκτεν* Austin (edd. OCT, Bain), *εὖ <τέ> τοκεν* Jacques, *ὥστ' ἔ<τε>κεν* Arnott (ed. Sbordone).

¹⁷ I suppose that in the fragmentary lines of *Misoumenos* 448ff. *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* may refer to the cook, who was hired to prepare a dinner for guests (270f.) and *ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου* was already there for the preparation of the wedding feast.

P.A.Cartledge (Clare Hall, Cambridge): *Yes, Spartan kings were heroized.*

LCM 13.3 (Mar.1988), 43-44

Robert Parker's dense note (LCM 13.1 [Jan.1988], 9f.), prompted perhaps by what he kindly calls my 'interesting study' (viz. *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, London & Baltimore, 1987, 331-43), deserves a response. Heroization and hero-cult lie at the centre or bottom of an important complex of Greek politico-religious manifestations that somehow mediated between the world of men and the world of the gods (see e.g. A.D.Nock's classic article, *HTHR* 1944, repr. in his *Selected Essays*). It therefore matters whether all Spartan kings, regardless of how or where they died, were formally and ritually translated from mortal to semi-divine status at death (my position) or rather were honoured with spectacular funeral rites which demonstrated that they were already seen in their lifetime as heroes in an idiosyncratic sense on account of their divine descent (Parker's position, I believe).

Parker's case rests primarily on his understanding of the following passage from the Xenophontic (and, as I think, Xenophon's) *Lak.Pol.* (15.8-9): αὐται μὲν οὖν αἱ τιμαὶ [οἴκοι] ζῶντι βασιλεῖ δέδονται, οὐδέν τι πολὺ ὑπερφέρουσαι τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐβουλήθη (sc. Λυκούργος) οὔτε τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τυραννικὸν φρόνημα παραστήσαι οὔτε τοῖς πολίταις φθόνον ἐμποιῆσαι τῆς δυνάμεως. αἱ δὲ τελευτήσαντι τιμαὶ βασιλεῖ δέδονται, τῇ δὲ βούλονται δηλῶν οἱ Λυκούργου νόμοι, ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ'ὡς ἥρωας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς προτετιμήκασιν. He does not translate the passage, but he takes it to mean that 'though the funeral proves in Xenophon's eyes that the kings have been in a certain sense heroes all along, he does not claim that they continued to be honoured as heroes in the more normal, cultic sense'. That interpretation is at least contestable. For its import to be grasped the passage needs to be set in its wider context. This is provided by Xenophon's obviously controversial and polemical claim that the kingship is 'the only office (ἀρχή) which continues exactly as it was originally constituted' (*Lak.Pol.*15.1).

That claim is developed by a quite detailed exposition of the honours (τιμαί), ten in all, that, thanks to Lycurgus, 'are bestowed upon a king in his lifetime' (following Cobet, Parker rightly brackets οἴκοι). This is followed by the surprising assertion that the honours just enumerated 'do not greatly exceed those granted to private individuals', that is Spartans not holding any ἀρχή or at any rate not a (uniquely) hereditary one like the kingship. The author then claims privileged access to the intentions of Lycurgus: the lifetime honours were so framed as to avoid tyrannical pride on the part of the kings, envy on the part of the citizens. The final sentence of the chapter, and of the entire work as we have it, provides the antithetical counterpart to the lifetime honours: 'But as to the honours granted to a king on his death, thereby the laws of Lycurgus make plain that the Spartans bestow exceptional honours on their kings, not as mortal men, but as heroes'.

To avoid undue repetition of what I have written elsewhere, I confine myself to two points, both in a sense stylistic or rhetorical. First, there is a glaring disproportion in the amount of space Xenophon devotes to the lifetime honours as opposed to the honours at death. Parker writes that the reality (as he supposes Xenophon to say) of the king's heroic status was revealed 'of course' through the spectacular royal funeral described 'so strikingly' by Herodotus (6.58). Yet Xenophon himself nowhere chooses to emulate Herodotus' description – not here, nor in the *Agasilaos* (where such a description would surely have been entirely in place) nor in the *Hellenika*, where he had at least three and perhaps four opportunities. *Agasilaos* is stated matter-of-factly to have 'received the royal funeral' (*Ages.*11.16). Only in the case of *Agasilaos'* elder half-brother does Xenophon venture anything more: ἔτυχε σεμνοτέρως ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου ταφῆς (*Hell.*3.3.1).

But this raises my second point, which is that both the *Lak.Pol.* and the *Hell.* passages are ambiguous. In the latter does Xenophon mean to imply that Agis was not an ἀνθρώπος and so, fittingly, received more awesome funeral rites? Or, since he was an ἀνθρώπος, that the funeral rites were unduly awesome? In the former does Xenophon mean that the funeral rites revealed what had hitherto been unclear or disguised, namely that the kings had been heroes all along? Or that the nature of the rites revealed or showed plainly that the kings were being honoured thereby as heroes rather than mortal men? The latter seems to me the more likely, for two reasons. First, if the Spartans did regard their kings as heroes in their lifetime, it is odd that Xenophon should have virtually denied that they did (their lifetime honours 'do not greatly exceed those granted to private individuals'); secondly, the contrast between the status of ἀνθρώπος and that of ἥρωας is one

that it is natural to draw in the context of the funeral of a great man, since it was only at his death that the issue of heroization might arise in normal circumstances (i.e. before the institution of ruler-cult by the Macedonians; on the divine honours paid to Lysander on Samos see *Agesilaos* 82-6). There is no need to attribute an idiosyncratic sense to *ἥρωας* in the *Lak.Pol.* any more than there is to *ἀνθρῶπος* in either passage.

In short, the combination of silence and ambiguity conveys to me the distinct but coded Xenophontic message that Xenophon radically disapproved of the 'laws of Lycurgus' regarding a Spartan king's funerary honours. Like his patron and friend Agesilaos, and unlike that king's one-time lover and mentor Lysander, Xenophon believed that human and divine honours were *res dissociabiles*. But Xenophon went further: mortal men should normally receive human funerary honours. Even heroic ones were excessive. Apart from Xenophon (as read by me), there is, as Parker says, nothing in the slight further evidence to show that dead kings 'continued to be honoured as heroes in the more normal, cultic sense'. But Pausanias is not the most trustworthy witness, and Athenaeus (our main source of quotations from the Hellenistic and early Roman 'Spartan Constitution' genre of literature) was unfortunately more interested in food and drink than more cerebral or spiritual matters. On the other hand, there is the undoubted heroization of Chilon (related to both royal houses) to consider, and it is hard to believe that none of the many anonymous stone 'hero-reliefs' of Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic date was erected in honour of a dead Spartan king (most recently M.Pipili, *Laconian Iconography of the Sixth Century B.C.*, Oxford 1987, 60, 103 n.610).

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James N.o'Sullivan (Hamburg): *The Irish oral poet Raftery*

LCM 13.3 (Mar.1988), 44-46

Every Irishman, and especially Irish classicists, will welcome interest shown by classical scholars in Irish literature, the fruitfulness of which for Homeric studies in particular has been demonstrated by Kevin O'Nolan (esp. *CQ* ns19 [1969], 1-19, & 28 [1978], 23-37). In a recent article on 'Classical themes in the poems attributed to Raftery', *MPhL* 6 (1984), 69-87, Professor H.D.Rankin shows a considerable knowledge of Irish literature and relevant secondary material, and his own treatment may quicken interest in the subject among classicists, but in some important respects his article will mislead anyone relying on him for information and for access to the original Irish poetry he discusses. Here I shall attempt to give a more reliable sketch of Raftery and the circumstances under which he composed.

The poet Antoine O Reachtuire (ca. 1784-1835), usually referred to as 'Raftery', the Anglicized form of his name, was blind from early boyhood; he depended on hearing for his knowledge of classical literature and mythology. It is not clear from Rankin's account that Raftery was in this respect any worse off than his sighted contemporaries in a part of Ireland where in his lifetime allusions to classical antiquity were 'based upon an oral tradition that depends upon the authority of a written literature half-forgotten and practically inaccessible' (Rankin p.69). He was therefore an oral poet at least in the sense of composing his poems – lyric and occasional, usually of less than 100 verses, but ranging up to around 200 and exceptionally to almost 400 – without the aid of writing. The poems were collected (partly from oral tradition, partly from manuscripts) and printed for the first time in 1903 by Douglas Hyde (later first President of the Irish Republic), who also constructed a biography of the poet based on oral tradition. Rankin's references are to this edition, which included Hyde's (presumably accurate) English translations of the poems. These are not mentioned by Rankin, who gives renderings of his own. The 1903 edition has not been available to me, and I have used the edition produced by Hyde in 1933 entirely in Irish, in different political circumstances and under the auspices of the new Irish government.

Rankin's title makes no mention of oral composition, but the article is dominated by the idea of Raftery as an oral poet in a sense that goes far beyond his merely being blind and so unable to write. From being the receiver of oral lore, classical and Gaelic, he becomes a full-blown oral improviser. The nearest we get to evidence for this far-reaching oral character of his poetic activity – and in this context it must be kept in mind that he was in any case not an epic poet – is when Rankin (p.72) quotes, and translates as follows, the autobiographical verses which, according to the oral biographical tradition as represented by Rankin, were delivered by the poet

in a public house in response to the overheard question 'Who is that singer?':

*Mise Raifteri an file
Lán dochais agus grádh
le súilibh gan solus
le ciúnas gan crádh
dul siar ar m'aistear
le solus mo chroidhe
fann agus tuirseach
go deireadh mo shlighe
féach anois mé
agus m'aghaidh ar bhalla
ag seinm céoil
do phócaibh falamh*

I am Raftery the poet
full of hope and love
with eyes without light,
with gentleness without harshness
going West on my Journey
by the light of my heart
weak and weary
to the end of my way
look now on me
and my face to the wall
making up songs
for empty pockets.

Rankin precedes this with the statement that 'another mark of the oral poet is his ability to improvise or, more accurately, to compose at great speed from a repertoire of formulaic phrases and ideas', adding that 'Raftery was undoubtedly able in this category', and follows it with remarks on how the poet 'was reduced to near beggary, *making poetry, as he says, for empty pockets*' (my italics). It is of minor importance whether one believes that a short poem like that quoted above is an accurate record of verses extemporized in a public house. What would be of immense interest is the apparent reference to the blind poet to himself 'making up songs (making poetry) for empty pockets' there in the public house.

But this extemporizing oral poet is to be found only in Professor Rankin's translation. The Irish words that become 'making up songs (making poetry) for empty pockets' mean in fact 'playing music to empty pockets'. Raftery played the fiddle for a living, as Rankin notes (p.74). Here is a translation of Hyde's 1933 introduction to the autobiographical poem (p.26): 'There are, in my opinion, few things that stir the heart as does the wonderful answer that he [Raftery] gave to someone who saw him playing (*ag seinm*) and didn't know him. This man asked aloud "Who is the musician (*ceóltóir*)?" and our blind violinist (*bheidhleadóir*) answered: *Mise Raifteri* etc.'. The mistranslation to which I have drawn attention here is not the only misinterpretation of Irish in Rankin's article, but it is the most misleading one.

Professor Rankin envisages (p.71) Raftery as 'composing at great speed from a repertoire of formulaic phrases and ideas'. He presents no evidence for the use of verbal formulae in the works attributed to the poet – and I should be surprised to see any significant evidence of this – and by formulaic ideas he seems to mean only the repeated use of a limited stock of references to classical and Gaelic mythology and saga. In general he proceeds from the blind lyric poet Raftery in a largely oral society to the fully-fledged oral poet allegedly displaying compositional traits that the classicist will immediately associate with Parry and Greek epic, and for this latter view of the poet we have no evidence from his compositional technique, none at all in fact apart from the little poem I have touched on above, in which Raftery, as we have seen, does not represent himself as a kind of lower-class Irish Phemius.

Hyde had no specific interest in the oral aspect of Raftery's poetry, and we are left to pick up what we can from his account. Sometimes his introductory remarks to some of the shorter pieces (a few lines) represent these as spontaneous improvised utterances, but even here it must be borne in mind that the oral biographical material reflected in such remarks is in general full of uncertainty and conflict even on basic matters, and the stories it offers about the exact circumstances of composition of particular pieces must be regarded with suspicion. The most important statement on the composition of Raftery's poems comes from an old woman who had, as a girl, known the poet well and told Hyde (p.23): 'When he would be lying on his bed in the night, that's the time he'd make his songs [*abhrán*; it is clear from the context that the reference is to verbal compositions], and 'twould put wonder on you in the morning and you not knowing where he got them'. Premeditation, not improvisation, is in keeping with the elaborate system of vowel correspondences in most of the poems attributed to Raftery. Such composition in advance of any performance by a poet who operated without the aid of writing and whose poetry was initially preserved orally is not without interest for the Homerist (cf. most recently A.Thornton, *Homer's Iliad: its composition and the motif of supplication* [*Hypomnemata* 81], Göttingen 1984, 13ff., 38f. with further literature).

In the course of his discussion of oral culture in Ireland Professor Rankin writes: 'The

training of Irish poets was oral rather than visual throughout the history of Irish literature. Prose stories, the descendants of these old saga cycles [Rankin has cited the *Táin Bó Cúailgne*, which is a prose (!) epic with interspersed passages of verse], preserved that most characteristic sign of the oral composer, the *formula*' (Rankin's italics). This (in particular 'descendants' and 'preserved' suggests that the formulae of the prose derive from earlier poetry. There is no evidence for this, and it is indeed clear that the non-metrical formulaic material in question has developed in prose. The special importance of this material is precisely that it is prose and so provides a valuable (and usually overlooked) check on treating the formula and formulaic composition purely in terms of poetry and metre.

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194.—Peat-Gatherer in Ireland



133.—Egg-marketing in Ireland.



613.—Irish Mud Cabin.

Review: **H.D.Jocelyn** (Manchester)

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Marisa Squillante Saccone, *Le "interpretationes Vergiliana" di Tiberio Claudio Donato* (Studi e Testi dell'Antichità, Collana diretta da F.Cupaiuolo, xvii), Naples, Società Editrice Napoletana, 1985. Pp.128. Paper, L.20,000.

Books on Latin poetry and even commentaries on particular works now tend to concentrate more on vague paraphrase and appreciation of the 'artistic' and 'psychological' features of 'the poem as a whole' than on the said poem's language, subject matter and literary antecedents. They win praise for doing so and are recommended to the young in our institutions of learning. This is no modern plague. A text of the twelve books of the *Interpretationes Vergiliana* of Tiberius Claudius Donatus (hereafter 'TCD') survived the Dark Ages in a French Monastery. Several copies were made in the 9th century, some staying in France, others going to interested parties in Germany and Italy. One 9th-century copy of books I-V and another of books VI-XII arrived in Italy in the course of the 15th century to spawn together a large number of further copies of the whole work. TCD had accordingly gained many readers long before it was first committed to print, in Naples in 1535. From the year 1487, moreover, printed editions of Virgil often carried substantial extracts. Marisa Squillante Saccone (hereafter 'S.') declares at the end of her solid essay that TCD offers 'an integral picture' of the *Aeneid* that anticipates in many ways 'certain essential results of modern criticism'. Here may lurk an unconscious insight. One of her reviewers (E.Paratore, *RCCM* 27 [1985], 197) has attested to the benefit he gained from a reading of TCD. At any rate results await some brass-gutted investigator of the ancestry of what passes as 'modern criticism'.

Aelius Donatus, parts of whose enormous variorum commentary on Virgil's poems appear to be embedded in the commentary of Servius and in the so-called Danieline additions to this commentary, taught grammar in Rome during the reign of Constans and Constantius. Who TCD was and when he wrote no ancient source reveals. All the substance of his work permits us to say is that the Roman empire and its cultural institutions were intact at the time of writing. S. thinks he was a teacher of rhetoric, who used the commentary of Aelius Donatus and in turn provided a source for Servius. That would put him in a cultural context for which we have considerable evidence and make his work historically interesting.

S. demolishes effectively the theory that TCD was a professional jurist. She might have pointed out that the sort of evidence adduced in favour of this notion would make jurists of most writers of late Antiquity. Her attempt to show that TCD could have been used by Servius is less convincing. Comparative study cannot of itself establish more than that Aelius Donatus, Servius and TCD drew on a common tradition of exegesis. Neither is it at all likely that a man of the intelligence of Servius with access to the libraries of early 5th-century Rome should have deigned even to notice such stuff as the *Interpretationes*. S. is not the first to make TCD a teacher of rhetoric and the *Interpretationes* a school book. Here modern analogies mislead. The idea flies indeed in the face of all we know of the classical Roman educational system. The explanation of the *Aeneid* lay in the province of the *grammaticus*. Where the *rhetor* was concerned the poem provided passages for the exercise of *paraphrasis* and themes for declamation. It was known, of course, that Virgil had studied rhetoric, and as early as the 1st century many found the virtues proper to oratory in the speeches of the *Aeneid*, as they did in those of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Some *grammatici* dealt with speeches in narrative poems according to the categories of rhetorical theory. But the notion that the whole *Aeneid* was a sort of speech and required to be interpreted to the young like a work of Cicero's could only have come from an eccentric amateur, who still resented the floggings he had received for his idleness in the school of a *grammaticus*. TCD evidently passed to the school of a rhetor. Whether his studies there were any more effective may be doubted. The *Interpretationes* is a rhetorical work only in the modern sense of that adjective. I should remark by the way that TCD's avoidance of the allegorical approach to the *Aeneid* may reflect not so much good sense as a lack of philosophical training.

S. does not try to hide TCD's misquotations of the *Aeneid* itself, his total misunderstandings of many passages, his confusions of names and places, his mythological inaccuracies, his failures to ascertain the meanings of rare words, his prosodical errors. She makes much on the other hand of his way of discussing Virgil's use of the special linguistic registers of various arts and crafts. What is laid out, however, on pp.82-4 shows no very deep knowledge of the nautical register. There is much richer material on this topic in Servius' commentary (3.127 & 291; 5.159; 9.97) and in the Danieline additions (1.244; 3.275; 5.1; 11.327).

Neither S. nor any of her predecessors has asked how high was the quality of TCD's grasp of the art of rhetoric itself. The relative scarceness of technical terminology in the *Interpretationes* is remarkable. It suggests strongly the amateur rather than the professor.

TCD clearly regarded himself as a member of the social elite of his city and time. His Latinity was of the sort inculcated in the schools of grammar and rhetoric through many centuries. It aimed at making an emotional impression rather than at explicating an argument. Nevertheless signs of a number of developments in the spoken language of late Antiquity manifest themselves. Whether an exhaustive linguistic analysis would tie TCD to any particular city of the Empire or to any period between that of Septimius Severus and that of Romulus Augustulus seems doubtful. Such an analysis would, however, help to clarify the relationship of the *Interpretationes* to other works about Virgil's poetry which survive from Antiquity, and enable critics to test the validity of Georgii's classicizing correction of the transmitted text. By 1909 T.Stangl appears to have completed a special index to the 1262 Teubner pages of this text. His pupil, V.Wiesner, published in the difficult conditions of the Germany of 1920 some of the results of fifteen years' labour on TCD's Latinity: *Die Interpretationes Vergilianae des Ti. Claudius Donatus sprachlich untersucht*, I Teil (Diss. Würzburg 1920, Bamberg). J.B.Hofmann's call for more (*Philologische Wocheninschrift* 41 [1921], 1134-9) was in vain. The second chapter of S.'s essay has at least the virtue of re-opening the subject. It is a pity she made little use in her research of the rich comparative material now available in the published fascicules of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* and in Szantyr's revision of Hofmann's *Lateinische Syntax und Stylistik* (mentioned only once, at p.65 n.17).

S.describes well the salient features of TCD's 'rhetorical reading' of the *Aeneid*: the concern with the disposition of the principal themes of the poem, the stress on the encomiastic operation of the verbal style, the application of the concepts of generality and specificity to analysis of the narrative, the recommendation of emotional emphasis in the pronunciation of certain words and phrases, the particular interest in the speeches directly reported by the poet and in the effects which these exercised on the passions. She goes on to catalogue instructively the ways in which TCD treats the poet and his art: the presentation of Virgil as an inspired prophet and guide to conscience, the positive attitude to every artistic aspect of his poem, the defining of his principal purpose as the glorification of the emperor, the concern with his narrative techniques, the underlining of his loyalty to general poetic tradition, the claim for an ideological coherence in his account of the gods and fate, the search for psychological motivations behind his uses of words. All the same it has to be said that S. suffers from one of her author's principal vices, namely a proneness to find virtue where it does not exist. On pp.115-117 TCD's interpretations of a number of passages of the first book of the *Aeneid* are held up as 'interesting', 'pertinent', or even superior to those of the grammatical tradition. Something may be said about one of them.

The understanding of the reader of vv.254-5

*olli subridens hominum sator atque deorum
uultu, quo caelum tempestatesque serenat*

will be assisted by Servius' remark: *SVBRIDENS laetum ostendit Iouem et talem qualis esse solet cum facit serenum; risus enim ex laetitia oritur. poetarum enim est elementorum habitum dare numinibus* . . . (S. abbreviates misleadingly). The Danieline addition, *Ennius 'Iuppiter hic risit tempestatesque serenae | riserunt omnes risu Iouis omnipotentis'*, shows how much richer and more informative the older grammatical tradition must have been. TCD's *locuturus, inquit, Iuppiter subrisit: risit enim quasi uulgare est nec conuenit hic motus animi iis personis penes quas summa potestas est, sed temperauit, ut diceret subrisit, ut pars esset seruata publicae reuerentiae, pars exhibita benivolentiae quae filiae debet uexatae tribui* . . . (S again abbreviates too much), on the other hand, merely confirms what we can better deduce from other sources about general Roman ideas on the behaviour proper to a person in authority. It contributes nothing to the appreciation of Virgil's actual verses.